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IT TAKES A MIRACLE: AN ANALYSIS OF
JOHN H. WALTON’S VIEW OF COSMIC
TEMPLE INAUGURATION
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1. Introduction and Justification
In this article, I present a brief analysis of some interrelated issues that are
highlighted by John Walton in his recent book The Lost World of Genesis One.1
My goal is to evaluate his interpretation of Genesis 1 in connection with his
view of miracles and theology-science relations. The focus of my analysis is
justified in three ways:
First, it is justified by Walton’s summary description of what he has
presented in his book:
The position that I have proposed regarding Genesis 1 may be designated
the cosmic temple inauguration view. This label picks up the most important
aspect of the view: that the cosmos is being given its functions as God’s
temple, where he has taken up his residence and from where he runs the
cosmos. The world is his headquarters.2

Second, Walton introduces the concept of miracles in close connection
with his first two propositions concerning the inauguration of cosmic temple
functions. He proposes that Genesis 1 is ancient cosmology (proposition 1)
and, therefore, it is functional cosmology (proposition 2).3 Furthermore, he
concludes that in Genesis 1, as in other ancient cosmologies, “there were no
[supernatural] ‘miracles’ (in the sense of events deviating from that which was
‘natural’).”4
John H. Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins
Debate (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Academic, 2009).
2
Ibid., 162, emphasis original. The “cosmic temple,” as Walton terms it, is what
we commonly refer to as the cosmos or universe.
3
Ibid., 16-37. Each chapter of Walton’s book addresses a specific proposition. In
this article, I reference these propositions in parenthetical notations.
4
Ibid., 20. Walton also makes the same point about miracles in an opposite way:
“There is nothing ‘natural’ about the world in biblical theology, nor should there be
in ours” (ibid.). These two ways of describing miracles are possible because Walton
regards God’s actions as supernatural from a theological perspective and as natural
from a nontheological perspective. According to Walton, “a biblical view of God’s
role as Creator in the world does not require a mutually exclusive dichotomy between
‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’” (140). “The common dichotomy drawn today between
‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ did not exist in the ancient world” (134). See also the
discussion of propositions 15-18 below.
1
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Third, Walton draws implications for theology-science relations based on
his cosmic-temple-inauguration interpretation of Genesis 1. At the beginning
of chapter 13, he writes: “We have now completed the presentation of the
view that Genesis 1 presents an account of functional origins and will begin
to integrate this view into the broader issues of science and society.”5 His goal
is that “God’s work is [to be] fully integrated with our scientific worldview.”6
While my brief review seeks to present an accurate interpretation of
Walton’s views, I recognize that every interpretation inevitably involves the
risk of misinterpretation. In my assessment of Walton’s views, I can only
present some areas where I agree or disagree with him and some reasons for
my conclusions. His book deserves a much more extensive analysis than I can
present here. I have learned much from reading his book and I hope that my
review will highlight additional aspects of some important issues that he has
addressed. In the next section, I describe and assess his view of miracles and
the inauguration of cosmic-temple functions as described in Genesis 1.
2. Interpretation of Genesis 1
2.1. Description of Walton’s View
Walton seeks to ground his views of miracles and cosmic-temple inauguration
in what he believes to be an accurate interpretation of what Genesis 1 “really
says” (i.e., “the intended communication of the author and the ability of the
audience to receive that same intended message”) in its cultural context.7 In
this way, Walton also seeks to understand God’s intention, since “God has
communicated through human authors and their intentions.”8
Walton’s interpretation of Genesis 1 may be summarized as follows:
cosmic functions were created (proposition 3) from a nonfunctional beginning
5
Ibid., 114. Sean Cordry suggests that Walton’s “thesis has tremendous potential
to reshape much of the ‘science-religion’ debate” (“The Lost World of Genesis One:
Ancient Cosmology and the Origins Debate,” in Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith,

62/3 [2010]: 2270.
Walton, 143.
Ibid., 102. This is the “face value” or “literal” interpretation of the text (ibid.).
Walton, 102-104, further explains, “The same words can be used in a straightforward
manner, or be used in a symbolic, metaphorical, sarcastic or allegorical way. . . . If a
communication is intended to be metaphorical, the interpreter interested in the face
value will want to recognize it as a metaphor. If the author intends to give a history,
the interpreter must be committed to reading it that way. . . . If the Israelites, along
with the rest of the ancient Near East, thought of existence and therefore creation
in functional terms, and they saw a close relationship between the cosmos and the
temple, then those are part of the face value of the text and we must include them in
our interpretation.”
8
Ibid., 106.
6
7
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state (proposition 4) during three days of establishing functions (proposition
5), three days of installing functionaries (proposition 6), and one day of divine
rest (proposition 7) in the cosmic temple (proposition 8).9 “These [creation
days] are seven twenty-four hour days. This has always been the best reading
of the Hebrew text.”10
For the purposes of my assessment below, I must ask the following
question: How could all the events mentioned in Genesis 1 happen in seven
days without supernatural miracles? Walton’s answer to this question is evident
in his interpretation of Genesis 1, which he believes to be a statement about
God’s ceremonial/liturgical inauguration of cosmic functions (proposition 9),
rather than a statement about the material origins of the cosmos (proposition
10).11 While not denying that God is the source of material origins,12 Walton
regards the functional-origin interpretation of Genesis 1 as providing a more
accurate interpretation (proposition 11) than other approaches (proposition
12)13 that “are struggling to reconcile the scientific findings about the material
cosmos with the biblical record.”14

Ibid., 38-86.
Ibid., 91. See also John Walton, Genesis, NIV Application Commentary (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 2001), 71.
11
Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 87-101.
12
Walton writes: “If we conclude that Genesis 1 is not an account of material
origins, we are not thereby suggesting that God is not responsible for material origins.
I firmly believe that God is fully responsible for material origins, and that, in fact,
material origins do involve at some point creation out of nothing. But that theological
question is not the one we are asking. We are asking a textual question: What sort
of origins account do we find in Genesis 1? Or what aspect of origins is addressed
in Genesis 1?” (ibid., 44). He proposes that “A very clear statement must be made:
Viewing Genesis 1 as an account of functional origins of the cosmos as temple does not in any way
suggest or imply that God was uninvolved in material origins—it only contends that Genesis 1 is not
that story” (ibid., 96). Therefore, “If we say that the text includes a material element
alongside the functional, this view has to be demonstrated, not just retained because it
is the perspective most familiar to us” (ibid., 93-94).
13
Ibid., 102-113. Walton discusses the interpretive approaches of Young and Old
Earth Creationism, the Framework Hypothesis, and various forms of Gap Theory
(ibid., 108-113).
14
Ibid., 113. Walton, ibid., rejects approaches that “assume that the biblical account
needs to be treated as an account of material origins, and therefore that the ‘different’
scientific account of material origins poses a threat to the credibility of the biblical
account that has to be resolved. This book has proposed, instead, that Genesis 1 was
never intended to offer an account of material origins and that the original author and
audience did not view it that way. In fact, the material cosmos was of little significance
to them when it came to the question of origins.”
9
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The nature of Walton’s inauguration interpretation of functional creation
in Genesis 1 is evident in his comment on the relationship of the temple and
the cosmos.
[T]he creation of one is also the creation of the other. The temple is made
functional in the inauguration ceremonies, and therefore the temple is created
in the inauguration ceremony. So also the cosmic temple would be made
functional (created) in the inauguration ceremony. . . . The inauguration of
the cosmic temple—its actual creation, [was] accomplished by proclaiming
its functions, installing its functionaries, and, most importantly, becoming
the place of God’s residence.15

For Walton, Genesis 1 does not describe the material origin of the
cosmos as taking place in seven days. Rather it describes the ceremonial and
liturgical creation of the cosmos in seven days.16
Assessment of Walton’s View
One way in which Walton’s view of miracles and the inauguration of cosmic
functions should be evaluated is in terms of the success or failure of his goals,
which are to understand “what the Bible communicates,” to “preserve” and
15
Ibid., 88, 93. Walton argues that from the perspective of the ancient Near
East, “Creation takes place by giving things order, function, and purpose, which is
synonymous with giving them existence” (Ancient Near East Thought and the Old Testament
[Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006], 135). Compare an earlier statement: “It is difficult to
discuss comparisons between Israelite and Mesopotamian literature concerning
creation because the disparity is so marked” (John H. Walton, Ancient Israelite Literature
in Its Cultural Context [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1989], 26).
16
Vern S. Poythress comments: “Walton correctly observes that Genesis 1
focuses on practical functions rather than on chemical (material) composition. But
sometimes he shifts to a second meaning of ‘material’ and ‘function.’ He construes
‘function’ as narrowly religious: The seven days of Genesis 1 (which he construes as
24-hour days) describe the inauguration of a cosmic temple to its full functioning as
a temple. Before the seven days there would still be an earlier ordinary operation of
the astronomical, geological, and biological worlds over extended periods of time.
These earlier events belong to ‘the material phase’ that Genesis allegedly does not
mention ([Walton] pp. 92-99). The label ‘material’ now includes all aspects of physical
appearance” (“Appearances Matter” in World Magazine 24/17, 29 August 2009 (<www.
worldmag.com/articles/15785>). Walton asks in response: “Did the Israelites believe
their Old World Science? Undoubtedly they did. Did they ever think about the material
aspect itself ? Again, undoubtedly. Does this mean the Bible is offering an authoritative
revelation of material origins? Not at all. The material language simply represents
what they understood about the material world to convey the functional significance”
(“John Walton Responds to Vern Poythress’s Review of ‘The Lost World of Genesis
One,’” in The BioLogos Forum: Science and Faith in Dialog (<http://biologos.org/blog/
john-walton-responds-to-vern-poythress>).
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“enhance” its “theological vitality,”17 and “to identify, truly and accurately . . .
the thinking in the world of the Bible.”18
Walton seems to present his interpretation of Genesis 1 with a mixture
of confidence and tentativeness. On one hand, he writes confidently: “I
believe that this is a literal reading. A literal reading requires an understanding
of the Hebrew language and the Israelite culture. I believe that the reading
that I have offered is the most literal reading possible at this point.”19
On the other hand, Walton writes tentatively:
Even if the reader is not inclined to adopt the proposed interpretation
of Genesis 1, his or her theology could still be greatly enhanced by
the observations offered here by embracing a renewed and informed
commitment to God’s intimate involvement in the operation of the cosmos
from its incipience and into eternity. We all need to strengthen our theology
of creation and Creator whatever our view of the Genesis account of
origins.20

This tentativeness is proper given the availability of significant scholarly
research that provides a viable alternative to Walton’s interpretation of Genesis
1. Richard Davidson21 and Kenton Sparks,22 like Walton, seek to interpret
Scripture with attention to the divine and human dimensions and the cultural
context, without forcing a harmony with current scientific conclusions.23
Nevertheless, Davidson and Sparks propose views that are substantially
different from Walton’s concerning supernatural miracles.
Davidson proposes that Genesis 1 does present the concept of
supernatural miracles with regard to material and functional origins, as well as
with regard to divine interventions within the material and functional order.
This interpretation is based on several factors: (1) the central doctrines of
Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 7.
Ibid., 19.
19
Ibid., 170.
20
Ibid., 150. Similarly, concerning Moshe Weinfeld’s suggestion “that Genesis 1
could have served very effectively as the liturgy of . . . a [creation] festival,” Walton
comments that this “suggestion has much to commend it both textually and culturally,
though definitive evidence is lacking” (ibid., 91). Later he states that “Even though it
is natural for us to defend our exegesis, it is arguably even more important to defend
our theology” (ibid., 150).
21
Richard M. Davidson, “The Biblical Account of Origins,” in JATS 14/1 (2003):
4-43.
22
Kenton Sparks, God’s Words in Human Words: An Evangelical Appropriation of
Critical Biblical Scholarship (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008).
23
See Davidson, 24, n. 69, and 86; see also idem, “Biblical Interpretation,” in
Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology, ed. Raoul Dederen (Hagerstown, MD:
Review and Herald, 2000), 58, 60, 69, 85, 86, 95. See also Sparks, 313-322.
17
18
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Christianity, (2) the literal, historical genre of Genesis 1 and the book of
Genesis as a whole, (3) intertextual evidence from other parts of the Bible,
(4) the polemic of Genesis 1 against other ancient cosmologies, (5) profound
theology, (6) the commentary of a majority of scholars during the history of
the church, and (7) the research of a large number of critical scholars who are
not committed to traditional doctrines.24
Davidson’s conclusions are complemented by Sparks’s proposal that
the concept of supernatural miracles25 was widespread in ancient cultures.
Sparks distinguishes between a providential miracle, which may be explained
naturally, and a sign miracle, which is “an overt sign of God’s supernatural
power. . . . [Supernatural miracles] are not concealed within the events of
history but occur . . . as obvious evidence that God’s hand has moved in
history.”26 Concerning supernatural miracles, Sparks states:
[T]he universal scope of miracle testimonies gives one reason to suspect
that miracles, while exceptional, do occur. . . . [These] miracles are possible
only if there is a sacred or divine realm that could break into the world
of our existence. . . . Indeed, the human perception that there is another
dimension of reality, to some extent distinct from our own, is a widespread
phenomenon. Any student of religion knows this.27

In the next section, I describe and assess how Walton’s interpretation
of Genesis 1 and his view of miracles influence his perspective on theologyscience relations.
3. Application to Theology-Science Relations
Description of Walton’s View
Walton’s interpretation of miracles and Genesis 1 is closely connected with
his perspective on theology-science relations. First, as he views it, Genesis 1
does not contemplate any contrast between primary and secondary causation,
24
Davidson, “The Biblical Account of Origins,” 10-19. Compare Walton’s
comments on ancient culture, genre, intertextual evidence, polemic, profound/strong
theology, traditional interpretations (Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 23-37, 97,
102-107, 142-151, 171). Contrary to Walton, Paul Copan suggests that “A solid case
can be made for creatio ex nihilo in the OT—that it is indeed demanded by the text”
(“Creation ex Nihilo or ex Materia? A Critique of the Mormon Doctrine of Creation,”
in Southern Baptist Journal of Theology 9/2 [2005]: 34, emphasis original).
25
Sparks, 316.
26
Ibid., 316. What Walton describes as natural miracle signs of God’s constant
action (Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 20), Sparks, 316, identifies as providential
miracles.
27
Ibid., 317. By using this quotation, I do not intend to imply that Walton rejects
the distinction between God’s reality and our reality. My purpose is to show how Sparks
draws a different conclusion about supernatural miracles from this distinction.
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just as it does not contemplate any supernatural miracles that deviate from
what is natural. For this reason, he proposes that theology and science present
different perspectives on the same reality. The metaphysics of primary
causation is presented in theological accounts of cosmic origins, while
the metaphysics of secondary causation is presented in scientific accounts
(proposition 13).28 According to Walton, God is “carrying out his purposes
through the naturalistic operations of the cosmos . . . that . . . were decreed
by the word of God.”29 “What we identify as natural laws only take on their
law-like quality because God acts so consistently in the operations of the
cosmos.”30 Therefore, “we should not expect anything in the Bible . . . to
engage in the discussion of how God’s level of creative activity relates to . . .
the laws of nature.”31
Second, the impact of Walton’s view of miracles on theology-science
relations may be perceived in his proposal that Genesis 1 supports a unity in
diversity between God’s actions of creating and sustaining the functions of
the cosmos (proposition 14). One might be tempted to assume that Walton
opens a space for fundamentally different kinds of miracles in his distinction
between God’s acts of creating and sustaining. That assumption, however,
would be unfounded since he subsumes the act of sustaining under the act
of creating such that there is an ongoing creation that does not deviate from
the natural processes that are studied by science.32 He is also critical of “the
interventionist view [of miracles] that treats the functionality of natural
processes too lightly, as being inadequate to accomplish God’s purposes.”33
Third, Walton proposes that, from a theological perspective, the cosmos
is a designed and purposeful supernatural divine activity (proposition 15),
while, from a scientific perspective, the cosmos is natural, without purpose
or design (proposals 16 and 18).34 Therefore, he suggests that we should
not separate “various aspects of origins” according to “whether God did
it [supernaturally] or [whether] a naturalistic process could be identified.”35
Walton regards this as “a distinction that is essentially unbiblical.”36 For him,
this distinction also leads to a “God of the gaps” theology in which the

Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 20, 114-118.
Ibid., 117.
30
Ibid., 134.
31
Ibid., 20.
32
Ibid., 119-124.
33
Ibid., 120.
34
Ibid., 125-141, 152-161.
35
Ibid., 114.
36
Ibid., 115.
28
29
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progress of natural scientific explanations leaves less and less space for divine
actions.37
Fourth, Walton reasons that, within the reigning paradigm of science, “to
appeal to purpose is to shift to a different kind of [nonscientific] explanation
(e.g., metaphysical, theological). . . . If scientists simply threw up their hands
and admitted that a metaphysical, teleological explanation was necessary, they
would be departing from that which is scientific.”38 Yet, Walton questions
“whether we can assume such hard and fast lines of distinction between the
scientific and the metaphysical. It is true that observations can be put into
one category or the other, but the fact is that such a categorization is artificial
because none of us has a worldview comprised of only one of them. Science
and metaphysics blend together in life.”39
Nevertheless, Walton takes a neutral theological position with regard
to what science suggests about material origins, possibly because scientists
“at this point . . . are not willing to rewrite the current rules of science.”40
He concludes that theology cannot be threatened by what science proposes
because theology does not propose a description of material origins.41 For
him, this approach to theology-science relations does not produce a weaker
theology; it produces a stronger one (proposition 17).42 “When God’s work
is fully integrated with our scientific worldview and science is seen to give
definition to what God is doing and how he is doing it, we regain a more biblical
perspective of the work—a perspective that is theologically healthier.”43 For
Walton, such a theology should emphasize the following themes: (1) God’s
role in everything, (2) an ongoing Creator role, (3) God’s control of cosmic

Ibid., 114.
Ibid., 130, 116-117.
39
Ibid., 130-131.
40
Ibid., 129.
41
According to Walton, “Science cannot offer an unbiblical view of material
origins, because there is no biblical view of material origins aside from the very general
idea that whatever happened, whenever it happened, and however it happened, God
did it” (ibid., 113). “[Genesis 1] looks to the future (how this cosmos will function
for human beings with God at its center) rather than to the past (how God brought
material into being)” (ibid., 118). “Q: When and how did God create the material
world? A: According to the interpretation offered in this book, the Bible does not
tell us, so we are left to figure it out as best we can with the intellectual capacity and
other tools that God gave us. But the material world was created by him” (ibid., 169).
“Genesis 1 gives us no cause to argue with the idea of the physical world coming
about by a slow process” (ibid., 150).
42
Ibid., 142-151.
43
Ibid., 143.
37
38
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functions, (4) sacred space, (5) Sabbath, (6) order and disorder (sin), (7) the
human role, and (8) the goodness of creation.44
Assessment of Walton’s View
I agree with Walton’s concerns that (1) theological and scientific perspectives
on causation should be kept distinct but not separate, (2) there is a sense in
which divine creativity extends beyond the end of God’s activity during the
creation week, (3) theology should not be threatened by scientific progress
or feel pressured to accommodate itself to current scientific theories, and (4)
scientists sometimes fail to be metaphysically neutral. I disagree, however,
with some aspects of his response to these concerns.
With regard to the first two concerns, I see no contradiction between
the purposeful perspective of Scripture and the terminology of primary and
secondary causation. It seems to me that Genesis suggests that God acts
as primary cause when he miraculously creates the cosmos out of nothing,
miraculously sustains it so that it continues to exist, and miraculously intervenes
within it. Yet there is room for freedom, since God’s miracles establish the
cosmos as a secondary cause and enable secondary causes within the cosmos.
This interpretation provides a viable alternative to Walton’s proposal that
primary and secondary causation are simply different ways of interpreting
the cosmos. My interpretation also gives more definition to the paradox of
intimate divine involvement with everything without compromising human
freedom.45
With regard to Walton’s other two concerns, his comments imply that
theology and science inevitably influence each other either positively or
negatively. Therefore, I propose that his effort to be neutral is futile. Moreover,
his neutrality aims for full theology-science integration, which leads to a
compromise of biblical revelation concerning supernatural miracles. Instead,
what we need is a mutually respectful dialogue between theology and science.
In contrast to Walton’s theology-science integration, theology-science dialog
can result in a stronger theology grounded in biblical revelation and a stronger
science grounded in God’s general revelation in the cosmos.46
Ibid., 142-151.
Walton, 122, mentions “several times” that his proposal “does not result in
a view of God as a micromanager, but it insists that he cannot be removed from
the ongoing operations.” He concludes that “the paradox of intimate involvement
without micromanagement defies definition.”
46
Martin Hanna, “The Use of Science in Theology: Case Studies of Thomas
F. Torrance and Langdon B. Gilkey” (Ph.D. dissertation, Andrews University, 2004).
Walton’s proposal seems closer to the dialectical or correlational model for theologyscience relations proposed by Gilkey, where theology is involved with “correlatively .
. . interpreting the human situation,” which is “formed largely by . . . science” (Message
44
45
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In addition, I agree with the themes that Walton includes in his version
of a strong theology. I disagree, however, with the extent to which he neglects
the concept of supernatural miracles when he (1) emphasizes the role of
science to “give definition to what God is doing and how he is doing it,”47
(2) minimizes distinctions between functional creation and ongoing creativesustaining activity, (3) limits the significance of the creation of cosmic
material, (4) distinguishes God’s person from his place in sacred space, (5)
limits human imitation of God’s creative work and Sabbath rest, (6) discusses
the cosmic order and the disorder of sin, (7) relates the human role to God’s
intimate involvement with everything, and (8) explains the relations between
moral and natural good and evil.48
Finally, Walton has commented on the negative impact that secular
scientific presuppositions can have on the credibility of the biblical revelation.49
Also, he has interpreted Genesis 1 in a way that seems to place the content of
its revelation beyond the threat of these scientific presuppositions. It may be,
though, that scientific presuppositions have indirectly led him to underestimate
the significance of the scholarly research that suggests that Genesis 1 does
present God as supernaturally creating, sustaining, and intervening in the
cosmos. Therefore, the theological challenge of scientific presuppositions
should be addressed more directly.
Both Davidson and Sparks point out the scientific presuppositions of
the historical-critical method and the need for Christian theology to clarify
its response to these presuppositions. Sparks allows for scientific criteria of
historical criticism (i.e., methodological doubt, analogy, and correlation)50 to
and Existence [New York: Seabury, 1979], 53, 57-58). I prefer the dialogical approach
proposed by Thomas F. Torrance. “A theological science . . . cannot but contribute to the
purity of the human sciences, but it can hardly do that unless it is prepared to enter into a
genuine dialogue with them. . . . This in turn will have a healthy impact upon theological
science” (Theological Science [London: Oxford University Press, 1969], 284).
47
Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 143.
Ibid., 142-151.
“The historical-critical method suggested that we should accept as true only that
which can be empirically proven. The new historiography was concerned only with
natural cause and effect in history” (John H. Walton, Victor Harold Matthews, Mark
William Chavalas, eds., The IVP Bible Background Commentary: Old Testament [Downers
Grove: InterVarsity, 2000], 211).
48
49

50
Sparks, 213-322. Modern skepticism about miracles has been influenced greatly
by David Hume’s famous essay “On Miracles” (1748). The most influential advocate
of Hume in biblical and theological studies was Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923), who
introduced three fundamental principles of historical criticism: methodological doubt,
analogy, and correlation (Sparks, 314). According to Davidson, “The word ‘criticism’
is used here in the technical sense of Descartes’ ‘methodological doubt’ and refers to
the autonomy of the investigator to interrogate and evaluate the scriptural witness, to
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provide evidence for or against the historical accuracy of biblical accounts
of supernatural miracles. But where Walton expresses theological reasons
for rejecting the concept of supernatural miracles, Sparks proposes that
there may be theological reasons for affirming certain supernatural miracle
accounts even when there may be insufficient historical-critical evidence to
validate them. He regards some of the supernatural miracles mentioned in the
Bible as theologically necessary.51
In contrast with Sparks, Davidson proposes that secular scientific
presuppositions are unsuitable for historical-biblical research, though he
uses similar study tools as Sparks.52 This approach to the study of the Bible
leads Davidson to a very different conclusion than Walton on the subject
of supernatural miracles. Davidson regards it as theologically necessary to
recognize the need for “supernatural spiritual assistance” in interpreting
Scripture.53 In addition, biblical scholars “must consciously reject any external
keys or systems to impose on Scripture from without, whether naturalistic
(closed system of cause and effect without any room for the supernatural),
judge the truthfulness, adequacy, and intelligibility of the specific declarations of the
text. . . . The principle of analogy . . . assumes that present experience is the criterion
for evaluating events narrated in Scripture, inasmuch as all events are, in principle,
similar. . . . The principle of correlation states that history is a closed system of cause
and effect with no room for supernatural intervention. . . . This is not to say that all
historical critics deny the existence of God or the supernatural. But methodologically,
historical criticism has no room for the supernatural” (“Biblical Theology,” 90).
51
Sparks, 315-316, points out that “it is the very nature of the case that miracles
are not caused by antecedent historical events. Their cause is not a product of human
agency or of natural events; their immediate cause is divine agency, which moves into
history from without.” Nevertheless, miracles may be evaluated positively within a
historical-critical approach because “Troeltsch seems to have overlooked something in
his analysis of miracles: once they occur, miracles certainly produce posterior historical
effects. . . . Genuine miracles leave historical effects in their wake” (ibid., 318). Where
there is insufficient historical evidence, “Perhaps we believe in the Bible’s miracles
precisely because they are miracles of the right sort. . . . So critical historiography does
not hold all of the cards when it comes to making judgments about history” (ibid.,
319). “There is no reason at all that the church should consider these matters only in
terms of modern historiography. The theological reflection of the church . . . also
counts as evidence in our historical equations” (ibid., 320, emphasis original).
52
Davidson writes: “Those who follow the historical-biblical method apply similar
study tools utilized in historical criticism. Careful attention is given to historical, literary
and linguistic, grammatical-syntactical, and theological details, as outlined throughout
this article. But while utilizing the gains brought about by the historical-critical method
in sharpening various study tools for analysis of the biblical text, there is a consistent
intent to eliminate the element of criticism that stands as judge upon the Word” (ibid.,
“Biblical Theology,” 96).
53
Ibid., 66.
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evolutionary (the developmental axiom), humanistic (human beings as the
final norm), or relativistic (rejection of absolutes).”54 Therefore, his face-value
reading is very different from Walton’s. Davidson concludes that “a Biblebased hermeneutic accepts at face value the biblical accounts of the creation
of this world . . . and the other historical assertions of Scripture, including the
supernatural, miraculous events.”55
4. Summary and Conclusion
Walton’s view of miracles, Genesis 1, and theology-science relations is
interrelated with his proposal that ancient cosmologies do not describe
supernatural miracles. This led me to ask the question: How could all the
events mentioned in Genesis 1 happen in seven days of creation without
supernatural miracles? Walton’s answer is that creation involved ceremonial
and liturgical divine acts that established cosmic functions and installed
cosmic functionaries. Therefore, viewed theologically, these actions are
supernatural; and viewed scientifically, these actions are natural. This overlap
of perspectives also applies to the material origins of the cosmos, which, for
Walton, may be investigated by science. In this way, he avoids a “God of the
gaps” theology that is threatened by the progress of scientific explanation.
In addition, Walton makes important distinctions between supernatural
primary causation and natural secondary causation, and between God’s actions
of creating and sustaining. At the same time, he blurs these distinctions in
a way that unfortunately leads to a practical identity between the cosmic
process and God’s design, purpose, and action. This leads to the paradox of
how God can be intimately involved in this way without micromanagement
that precludes human freedom. Nevertheless, Walton concludes that the full
integration of theology and science will lead to a stronger theology that is not
threatened by scientific presuppositions and conclusions. However, science
may have influenced him to underestimate significant scholarly research that
provides an alternative to his proposal.
In contrast with Walton’s proposal, the historical-biblical research by
Davidson suggests that Genesis 1 does indicate that supernatural acts by God
were involved in the material and functional origins of the cosmos. Moreover,
these divine acts include supernatural interventions during and after the
creation week. Also in contrast with Walton’s proposal, the historical-critical
research by Sparks suggests that, since the concept of divine action from
outside the cosmos through supernatural miracles was widespread in ancient
cultures, we have historical reasons to believe that such miracles do occur.
Bible students would do well to explore the evidence supporting
the interpretation of Genesis 1 as indicating that it takes various kinds of
Ibid., 67.
Ibid., 70.
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supernatural miracles for God to create, sustain, and intervene in the cosmos.
From this perspective, the origin of the cosmos cannot be reduced to cosmic
processes. Neither can God be explained away by the progress of science.
In addition, God’s intimate involvement creates, sustains, and interacts with
human freedom. While God does act indirectly through natural processes,
he also acts directly to create, sustain, and intervene within them. God is
always active, directly and indirectly. Either way, when God acts, it takes a
supernatural miracle.

